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Articles
The Use of Civil RICO in International
Arbitration: Some Thoughts After
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon
ROBERT M. JARVIS*
I. INTlDUCTION
In June 1987, the United States Supreme Court handed down
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon' holding that claims brought
under the civil provisions of the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act2 are arbitrable regardless of whether
such claims arise in a domestic or international setting. 3 Such a
decision had been anticipated by a number of commentators for
months before Justice O'Connor authored Shearson.4 To these com-
* © Robert M. Jarvis 1988. Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center
B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University.
Professor Jarvis was formerly with the New York office of Baker & McKenzie, where he
specialized in handling international arbitrations and advised aviation, banking, and maritime
clients on civil RICO.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); See infra appendix following
conclusion (text of sections 1961-1964). See generally P. SMrr & T. REED, CIvI. Rico (1987).
It also should be noted that more than two dozen states and Puerto Rico have enacted
legislation patterned after the federal RICO statute. See Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being
A Criminal, 87 CoLum. L. Rnv. 661, 715 n.236 (1987). Many of the observations contained
in this article are generally applicable to these "Little RICO" laws.
3. 107 S. Ct. at 2346.
4. See, e.g., Newman & Burrows, Will RICO Move Abroad Through Int'l Arbitration?,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Newman & Burrows, Consequences of Int'l Arbitration
of Antitrust and RICO, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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mentators, it was only a matter of time before the Court expanded
on its earlier holdings in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.5 and Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.6 In Scherk, the Court had
ruled that claims brought under the federal securities laws were
arbitrable if they arose in an international setting. In Mitsubishi, the
Court relied on Scherk to find that claims made pursuant to the
federal antitrust laws were arbitrable if they arose in an international
setting.
The Shearson opinion disposed of civil RICO in just a few brief
paragraphs. Two reasons explain why such an important question
should have been dealt with in such a summary fashion. First, the
Court's attention was focused on the other issue presented by the
case, namely, whether domestic claims made under the federal se-
curities laws are arbitrable. Second, the Court found that the question
of whether civil RICO claims are arbitrable to a large extent already
had been answered by its holding in Mitsubishi.
The brevity of the Court's opinion is problematic for international
practitioners. While Shearson opens the door of the arbitration
hearing room to civil RICO, it does not even begin to answer a long
list of questions that the international bar is likely to find once
inside. Not only is Shearson silent on a variety of pre-award matters,
it also does not speak to a host of post-award concerns. While many
of these issues may be resolved eventually by the courts, this is small
comfort for those who must engage in international arbitration in
the interim.
In light of the foregoing, this article will identify the questions left
unanswered, and in a number of cases posed, by Shearson. It also
will offer some practical advice as to how these questions ought to
be resolved by the international bar until more definitive guidance is
provided by the courts. To do so, the article will begin with an
overview of Shearson. From there, it will examine some of the
questions raised by the decision. Next, the article will consider various
solutions. Finally, the article will conclude that the only truly effective
way to resolve the many problems posed by Shearson is by means
of a well-drafted arbitration clause. In order to help international
practitioners, a variety of approaches to the drafting of a suitable
arbitration clause will be presented.
5. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
6. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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II. THE Shearson Decision
On June 15, 1982, Eugene and Julia A. McMahon,. owners of a
funeral home in Yonkers, New York, opened a joint account with
the international brokerage firm of Shearson/American Express
(Shearson). The account was opened in the names of Eugene and
Julia A. McMahon in their individual capacities and as trustees of
the David J. Hodder & Son, Inc. Employee Pension Plan; the David
J. - Hodder & Son, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan; the Laurie Funeral
Home, Inc. Employee Pension Plan; and the Laurie Funeral Home,
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan. In connection with the establishment of
this account, Ms. McMahon signed two customer agreements which
provided that any disputes arising out of the handling of the account
would be submitted to arbitration. 7 Shearson subsequently assigned
Mary Ann McNulty, an experienced employee, to oversee the accounit.
In her capacity as account representative, Ms. McNulty bought
and sold various stocks for the McMahons. Initially, this trading
proved to be profitable for the McMahons. Later, however, the
account began to suffer losses. By the time the account wbs closed,
the McMahons had lost a substantial amount of money.
Following a review of the trades initiated by Ms. McNulty, the
McMahons concluded that Ms. McNulty had churned the account in
order to gain additional commissions for herself and added profits
for her employer." The McMahons also-believed that Ms. McNulty
deliberately had chosen high-risk investments for them to maximize
the churning, nd had failed to provide full disclosure about her
trades to the McMahons, despite their repeated requests for such
information. Thus, in 1984, the McMahons filed suit against Shearson
and Ms. McNuty in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
7. The arbitration provision stated that:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, to transactions with you for me or to this agreement or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules, then
in effect, of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Boards of
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock
Exchange, Inc. as I may elect.
107 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
8. An account is said to have been churned when an excessive number of trades have
been made on the account's behalf. Since a commission is received each time a trade is made,
churning an account permits a broker to earn large fees in a short time.
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The suit alleged that Ms. McNulty, with Shearson's knowledge,
had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 9
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission,10 and RICO. The
amended complaint also contained various state law claims for fraud
and breach of fiduciary duties. Because both customer agreements
contained arbitration clauses, Shearson responded by asking the
District Court to stay the suit pending arbitration."
In a lengthy opinion, the District Court found that while the
Securities Exchange Act claim was arbitrable, the RICO claim was
not yet ripe.' 2 As a result, it ordered the Securities and Exchange
Act claim to be submitted to arbitration. Once the arbitrators had
resolved that claim, the parties were to return to court to try the
RICO claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that neither claim
was arbitrable.'1 It held that just as the RICO claim was beyond the
power of the arbitrators to decide because it was based on a statute
designed to be enforced by the courts, so was the Securities and
Exchange Act claim. For support, the Second Circuit relied on Wilko
v. Swan 4 and American Safety Equipment v. J.P. Maguire & Co. 5
In Wilko, the United States Supreme Court held that an agreement
to arbitrate future disputes arising under the Securities Act of 193316
was unenforceable. Finding that Congress had enacted a specific
statute designed to protect investors in a federal forum, the Court
held that any pre-dispute waiver of the federal forum by the investor
was invalid.' 7 Although the soundness of Wilko began to be ques-
tioned almost immediately after it was announced, it quickly became
settled law.
A decade later, a similar issue arose with respect to antitrust
claims. Uniformly, lower courts held that such claims could not be
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
11. 107 S. Ct. at 2334. Shearson's request was made pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
(referring stay of proceedings where issue therein is referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing).
12. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 618 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986).
14. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
17. 346 U.S, at 434-35. The Court wrote that:
The words of § 14, . . . void any "stipulation", waiving compliance with any
"provision" of the Securities Act. This arrangement to arbitrate is a "stipulation"
and we think the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of "provision" that
cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act.
Id.
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submitted to arbitration because of the need to ensure that the
policies behind such laws were upheld. Although some commentators
balked at this view,' 8 the issue seemed to be settled by the Second
Circuit's 1968 decision in American Safety. In that case, the court
wrote that while it harbored no distrust of arbitrators, "the pervasive
public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws" made the courts
the only appropriate forum for the resolution of such claims.' 9
Meanwhile, the legislature was busy addressing another pervasive
public interest by enacting RICO. ° Responding to unprecedented
domestic strife and violence, Congress sought to provide federal law
enforcement officials with a weapon against organized crime.21 Its
solution was to give them a means of prosecuting defendants for
having engaged in a pattern of racketeering. 22 Defendants found
guilty of racketeering could draw heavy sentences, large fines, and
have any property accumulated through racketeering forfeited to the
government. The primary target of the new law became corrupt
union bosses.2
18. See, e.g., Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust - Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L.
Rnv. 1097 (1969). Most commentators durifg this period, however, agreed that antitrust claims
should not be heard in arbitration. See, e.g., Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of
Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1085 (1969); Farber, The Antitrust Claimant and Compulsory
Arbitration Clauses, 28 FEn. B.J. 90 (1968); and Note, Private Arbitration and Antitrust
Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. I". & Com. L. REv. 406 (1969).
19. 391 F.2d at 827-28. Recently, however, a trial court sitting in the second circuit
concluded that American Safety was no longer valid in light of Shearson. See Gemco
Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F.'Supp. 972, 978-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The
Gemco case is discussed at length in Stoli & Goldfein, Arbitration of Domestic Antitrust
Claims, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
20. RICO was passed as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 Ihereinafter
OCCA]. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1982)). The enactment of RICO was foretold in "1967, when the Katzenbach Commission
urged Congress to "make a full-scale commitment to destroy the power of organized crime
groups." See PmEsmair's COmmissioN ON LAW ENsoRcm&NrT ANo AnDmA srnAriON o JusTics,
Tim CHALLENGE OF CRIE IN A FREE Socmray 200 (1967).
21. According to its drafters, the OCCA was "to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States ... by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Pub. L. No. 91-452, Statement of
Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 923 (1970). In particular, Congress found that "organized
crime continues to grow ... because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government
are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." Id. The Senate Report accompanying the bill
explained that RICO would "elilnlnatle]. .. the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce." Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. 76 (1969).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). A pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after [Octobir 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten
years (excluding any imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
Id. In a recent decision, -the Supreme Court wrote that, "tIThe heart of any RICO complaint
is the allegation of a pattern of racketeering." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2766 (1987) (emphasis in original).
23. See, e.g., Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeering,
17 Am. Cans. L. Ra,. 341 (1980).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 1
Although intended to be a criminal statute, RICO also contains
an easy-to-miss civil component. Under section 1964(c), a private
citizen can bring a civil suit for any damages suffered as a result of
the defendant's racketeering activities. For years, this provision went
largely unnoticed. But beginning in the early 1980s, civil plaintiffs
started to include RICO counts in their suits, often accompanied by
fraud and antitrust claims.
The appeal of civil RICO is obvious. Like the antitrust laws on
which it was modelled,2 civil RICO entitles a successful plaintiff to
treble damages as well as attorneys' fees. 2 As a result, it provides a
powerful litigation weapon and a strong lever in settlement negotia-
tions.
With civil RICO now out of the bag, the number of suits alleging
civil RICO jumped dramatically. 2 Legitimate businesses soon found
themselves as likely to be on the receiving end of a RICO suit as
ordinary career criminals. 27 While some observers, including Professor
G. Robert Blakey, the principal drafter of RICO, applauded the use
of RICO by civil plaintiffs,2 others called for an end to the deluge. 29
24. The similarity between section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), and civil
RI.O was recently commented upon in Agency Holding. In that case, the Court noted that,
"Even a cursory comparison of the two statutes reveals that (civil RICO] was patterned after
the Clayton Act." 107 S. Ct. at 2764.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 ... may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
26. The growth in the use of civil RICO between 1970 and 1984 is startling. Of the 270
pre-1985 district court decisions involving civil RICO, 3% were decided in the 1970s, 2% were
decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. REPORT OF TuE
AD Hoc CrviL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SEcnoN oF CoRsoRATioN, BAXNKNO AND
Busnmss LAW 55 (1985).
27. Id. (reporting that through 1984, 40% of all civil RICO cases involved securities
fraud, 37% involved common law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9%
involved allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional
criminals).
28. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg,
58 NOTRE DA.m L. Rv. 237 (1982). See also Blakey, RICO and its Progeny: Good or Bad
Law?, 2 NoTRE DAmE J. LAW, ETmcs & Pu. PoL. 369 (1986); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO). Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies,
53 TEar. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
29. For an early article which pleaded with the courts not to permit the use of civil RICO,
see Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. Rsv.
837 (1980). Recognizing the utility of criminal RICO, Professor Bradley fretted that widespread
use of civil RICO would lead to a demise of criminal RICO:
Yet RICO advances a legitimate national goal-keeping racketeers and racketeering
out of the nation's commerce. If the government and the courts would restrict
themselves to advancing this goal instead of using the statute to prosecute corrupt
politicians, errant corporate officials, and racketeers who have no design on com-
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Among those favoring stricter controls were the federal courts, who
suddenly found their dockets choked by civil RICO suits. In a spate
of conflicting and confusing opinions generated nearly as quickly as
new suits were filed, the courts began to cut away at civil RICO.
One device used by courts to stop the proliferation of civil RICO
suits was the insistence that the defendant previously have been found
guilty of criminal RICO.30 Since criminal RICO has a much higher
burden of proof, it seemed likely that only a handful of civil RICO
suits would survive this new requirement.
31
The game plan worked out by the lower federal courts was shat-
tered in 1985, however, when the United States Supreme Court held,
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,32 that a civil RICO claimant could
proceed in the absence of a criminal RICO conviction. The Court
found that since nothing in section 1964(c) required civil RICO
plaintiffs to wait for a criminal RICO conviction, there was no basis
for the imposition of such a requirement by the judiciary.
33
During the same term that it decided Sedima, the Court also took
up Mitsubishi in order to decide whether antitrust claims were arbi-
trable. Recognizing that the case involved a large, sophisticated
Japanese-American automobile manufacturer on the one hand, and
an equally large and sophisticated Puerto Rican car dealership on
the other, the Court found that neither party could be said to have
merce at all, most of the problems discussed herein would be minimized. If the
courts ... allow the government to expand the statute beyond the reach intended
by Congress, the end result may be that the Supreme Court will strike down major
portions of RICO as unconstitutional, thus thwarting the operation of the statute
entirely.
Id. at 892-93. Of course, time has proven Professor Bradley wrong. Not only has the Supreme
Court not struck down RICO, it has actively promoted its use. For two recent commentaries
which bemoan the Court's support for civil RICO, see Koenig, What Have They Done to
Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering,
35 Am. U.L. REv. 821 (1986), and Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer. The Need for Criminal
Protections Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HIAv. L. REV. 1288 (1987).
30. For a discussion of the prior-conviction requirement, see Abrams, The Place of
Procedural Control in Determining Who May Sue or be Sued: Lessons in Statutory Interpre-
tation From Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VND. L. REV. 1477, 1516-24 (1985).
31. In addition to requiring a prior criminal RICO conviction, the courts also used a
variety of other devices to cut back on civil RICO claims. These are reviewed in Abrams,
supra note 30, at 1524-38.
32. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
33. In an angry dissent, Justice Powell wrote that civil RICO "has been interpreted so
broadly that it has been used more often against respected businesses with no ties to. organized
crime, than against the mobsters who were the clearly intended target of the statute." Id. at
526. The majority disagreed, concluding that Congress had intended RICO "to be read
broadly," and found that its widespread use against legitimate businesses was "inherent in the
statute as written." Id. at 497, 499.
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been taken advantage of by agreeing to submit their disputes to
arbitration.34
Central to the Court's decision was the fact that the antitrust
claims in Mitsubishi arose in an international setting. Leaving open
the question of how it might rule on the question of the arbitrability
of a domestic antitrust suit, the Court wrote that its decision was
motivated by the fact that the contract was a transnational one. 3
The Court explained that in such circumstances, arbitration might
be the only way by which two companies from different legal,
economic, and cultural backgrounds could resolve their differences
amicably.36
For support, the Court turned to its earlier decision in Scherk. In
that case, the Court had held that a claim arising in an international
setting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had to be submitted
to arbitration, even though Wilko would otherwise bar arbitration. 37
34. 473 U.S. at 633. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, the petitioner, was a Japanese
automobile manufacturing company with a principal place of business in Tokyo, Japan. It
was formed as the result of a joint venture between Chrysler International, S.A., a Swiss
corporation registered in Geneva, Switzerland, and wholly owned by the Chrysler Corporation,
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation. The purpose of the joint
venture was the distribution through Chrysler dealers outside the continental United States of
vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi and bearing the Mitsubishi and Chrysler trademarks.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the respondent, was a Puerto Rican corporation with its
principal place of business in Pueblo Viejo, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. Id. at 616-17. As part
of the terms of the sales agreement, the parties had agreed to the following arbitration clause:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and
[Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or for the
breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with
the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
Id. at 617. The sales agreement further provided that any disputes would be governed by Swiss
law. Id. at 637 n.19.
35. The Court wrote:
As in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), we conclude that concerns
of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context.
473 U.S. at 629. The Court further stated that if international arbitration was to take its
rightful place in the international legal order, "it will be necessary for national courts to
subordinate notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration."
Id. at 638-39.
36. In so doing, the Court relied heavily on an earlier decision, The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). In The Bremen, the Court wrote that "agreeing in advance
on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international trade,
commerce, and contracting." Id. at 13-14.
37. Whether or not this is true is open to question, since Wilko was decided in connection
with the Securities Act of 1933, rather than the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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The Court noted that the international character of the dispute!8 had
required the parties' arbitration agreement to be upheld.39
After Mitsubishi, it was inevitable that the question of the arbitr-
ability of civil RICO claims would reach the Supreme Court. It did
not take long for Shearson to arrive. The Court granted certiorari
on October 6, f986,40 and heard oral argument on March 3, 1987.
Three months later, on June 8, 1987, the Court held that both claims
were arbitrable. Although deeply divided on the securities claim, the
Court majority found that such claims could be arbitrated. In doing
so, the five justices forming the majority4' rejected Wilko, considering
its assumptions about arbitration to be outdated.42 The dissenters,
led by Justice Blackmun, vigorously denied that Wilko had lost any
of its vitality, and argued that the exclusive remedy for such suits
still was to be found in a federal courtroom. 43
38. As explained by Justice Blackmun in Mitsubishi:
In Scherk, the American company Alberto-Culver purchased several interrelated
business enterprises, organized under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, as well
as the rights held by those enterprises in certain trademarks, from a German citizen
who at the time of trial resided in Switzerland. Although the contract of sale
contained a clause providing for'arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris of '"any controversy or claim [arising] out of this agreement or
the breach thereof," Alberto-Culver subsequently brought suit against Scherk in a
Federal District in Illinois
473 U.S. at 630. /
39. The Scherk Court wrote that:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international busi-
ness transaction .... A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce
an international arbitration agreement would ... invite unseemly and mutually
destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical litigation advantages .... [It
would] damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the
willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial agree-
ments.
417 U.S. at 516-17.
40. 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
41. Although a plurality opinion, a majority of the court agreed on the arbitration issue.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Powell, and Scalia signed this portion of the
opinion written by Justice O'Connor. Justice Blackmun penned a dissent/concurrence which
was joined in by Justices Brennan and Marshall [hereinafter cited as the dissenters]. Justice
Stevens wrote a separate dissent. 107 S. Ct. at 2332.
42. The Court wrote that:
[T]he mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is
difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
time. This is especially so in light of the intervening changes in the regulatory
structure of the securities laws. Even if Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration
were valid at the time Wfilko was decided, most certainly they do not hold true
today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC's oversight authority.
107 S. Ct. at 2341.
43. Justice Blackmun opined:
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Despite the intensity of the disagreement between the majority and
the dissenters over the securities issue, all of the justices agreed on
one point: civil RICO claims are arbitrable." Since section 1964(c)
said nothing about a federal forum, and since no public purpose
would be served by keeping such suits out of arbitration, the Court
had no difficulty in ordering the McMahons to submit their RICO
claim to arbitration.45 As support, the Court relied heavily on Mit-
subishi.46
Strictly speaking, Shearson is not an international decision since it
arose in a domestic setting and involved a dispute about the stock
market. Nevertheless, the international implications of the decision
are clear. At the time the Supreme Court decided Shearson, a number
of lower federal courts, including the Second Circuit, already had
held that RICO claims were arbitrable if they arose in an international
setting.47 The Supreme Court was careful to take note of this fact in
Even if I were to accept the Court's narrow reading of Wilko, as a case dealing
only with the inadequacies of arbitration in 1953, I do not think that this case
should be resolved differently today so long as the policy of investor protection is
given proper consideration in the analysis. Despite improvements in the process of
arbitration and changes in the judicial attitude towards it, several aspects of arbi-
tration that were seen by the Wilko court to be inimical to the policy of investor
protection still remain. Moreover, I have serious reservations about the Commission's
contention that its oversight of the SRO's arbitration procedures will ensure that the
process is adequate to protect an investor's rights under the securities acts.
Id. at 2353.
44. 107 S. Ct. at 2345, 2360.
45. The Court stated:
In sum, we find no basis for concluding that Congress intended to prevent enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims. The McMahons may effectively
vindicate their RICO claim in an arbitral forum, and therefore there is no inherent
conflict between arbitration and the purposes underlying § 1964(c). Moreover, nothing
in RICO's text or legislative history otherwise demonstrates congressional intent to
make an exception to the Arbitration Act for RICO claims. Accordingly, the
McMahons, "having made the bargain to arbitrate," will be held to their bargain.
Id. at 2345-46.
46. In disposing of the MeMahon's RICO claim, Justice O'Connor observed that:
Because RICO's text and legislative history fail to reveal any intent to override the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, the McMahons must argue that there is an
irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and RICO's underlying purposes. Our
decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. (citations
omitted), however, already has addressed many of the grounds given by the Mc-
Mahons to support this claim .... Not only does Mitsubishi support the arbitrability
of RICO claims, but there is even more reason to suppose that arbitration will
adequately serve the purposes of RICO than that it will adequately protect private
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 2344-45.
47. See, e.g., Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., Ltd., 815 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1987);
Valero Refining, Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1987). In Genesco, an
American clothing manufacturer purchased fabric from a Japanese seller and its American
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Shearson.48 It also did not draw the domestic/international distinction
as it had in both Scherk and Mitsubishi.49 Thus, it is clear that civil
RICO claims now may be heard in arbitration regardless of the
setting in which they arise.50
For the domestic bar, Shearson is a helpful decision. Not only
does Shearson serve to strengthen the Sedima holding, but in a
number of important respects it removes whatever doubts remained
after Sedima.51 For international lawyers, however, Shearson is only
the beginning.
agent. Two separate agreements were concluded, with one calling for arbitration in Japan and
the other providing for arbitration in the United States. On appeal, the Second Circuit held
that since the transaction between the parties was an international one, Genesco's RICO claim
had to be heard in arbitration because "the mandate of Mitsubishi applied with full force."
815 F.2d at 852. In Valero, the MIT LAUBERHORN had been chartered by the plaintiff to
carry oil from the Middle East to Texas. The plaintiff accused the defendant of having
conspired with the vessel's captain and four members of the crew to steal 9,200 barrels of oil.
The charter party between the plaintiff and the defendant contained a broadly worded
arbitration clause which directed all disputes to be settled by arbitration in New York City.
Ignoring the arbitration clause, the plaintiff filed suit and later amended its complaint to
include a RICO count. The defendant then moved to have the suit stayed pending arbitration.
Over the plaintiff's objection the Fifth Circuit ordered the case, including the civil RICO
claim, to arbitration. 813 F.2d at 60.
48. In addition to citing the Genesco case, the Court also cited Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin,
803 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1986). 107 S. Ct. 2344. Although Mayaja arose in a domestic setting,
it was heavily relied on by the Valero court. 813 F.2d at 62-63.
49. 105 S. Ct. at 2344. Indeed, Justice O'Connor went out of her way to make it clear
that the setting in which the McMahon's claim arose was immaterial:
In Mitsubishi, we held that nothing in the nature of the federal antitrust laws
prohibits parties from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international
commercial transactions. Although the holding in Mitsubishi was limited to the
international context (citations omitted), much of its reasoning is equally applicable
here.
Id.
50. Another commentator, agreeing with this conclusion has written:
By extending the rationale of Mitsubishi to the domestic sphere and establishing a
uniform rule of arbitrability for both domestic and international cases, the court
has not only affirmed the desirability of holding parties to their arbitration bargain,
but made unnecessary the splitting of disputes into two forums-an approach which,
in itself, downgrades the efficacy and contradicts the very purposes of arbitration.
Hollering, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon: Broadened Domain of Arbitration in the
U.S.A., 4 J. INT'L ARB. 153, 156 (Sept. 1987).
51. During the same term in which it decided Shearson, the Court also decided Agency
Holding v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987), and McNally v. United States, 107
S. Ct. 2875 (1987), thereby further resolving various questions concerning the use of civil
RICO in domestic cases. In Agency Holding, the Court ruled that the appropriate statute of
limitations for civil RICO claims was four years. Prior to the Court's pronouncement, lower
federal courts had applied a variety of time periods in the absence of a Congressionally enacted
statute of limitations. See generally Note, Statute of Limitations in Civil RICO Actions After
Wilson v. Garcia, 55 FoEDHAM L. Rnv. 529 (1987). In McNally, the Court held that the
federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), protects only money and property interests
and not the citizenry's right to good government. As a result, civil RICO claims based on
predicate acts of mail or wire fraud now must allege pecuniary or other tangible injury. 107
S. Ct. at 2879.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION AFMR Shearson
Having given a green light to the arbitrability of civil RICO claims,
there is no question that Shearson has altered forever international
arbitration. With so many American companies today engaging in
international arbitration, 52 and with so many international arbitrations
now being conducted in the United States, 53 a flood of civil RICO
claims in international arbitration can now be expected.54 Such claims
will have two principal effects. First, they will change the way in
which international arbitrations are conducted from the selection of
52. See, e.g., Hoellering, Is a New Practice Emerging from the Experience of the American
Arbitration Association?, 4 Iir'r TAX & Bus. LAw. 230, 230 (1986) ("Arbitration in general,
and international arbitration in particular, is flourishing in the United States due to the
favorable climate supporting alternatives to litigation."); Lessing, Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White
Hydraulics, Inc.: Applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act to International Commercial
Arbitration, 2 INr'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 331, 331 (1984) ("The number of U.S. cases involving
international arbitration issues has grown due to increased reliance on international arbitration
by American business engaged in international trade.").
53. Because of increased interest in the United States as a forum for the holding of
international arbitrations, a number of international arbitration centers are now in operation
or under discussion in such cities as Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and
San Francisco. See Address by Carl E.B. MeKenry, Secretary General of the International
Commercial Dispute Resolution Center (Miami), American Bar Association Symposium on
Resolution of International Commercial Disputes (Nov. 6, 1987); Buxbaum, Introduction, 4
ITrr'L TAx & Bus. LAv. 205, 205 (1986). At the same time, international arbitration centers
have also been set up in a number of foreign countries. See generally AmERicAN ARBITRATION
AssocIATIoN, SuRvEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBIaRAToN Srrn.s (1984); Stein & Wotman, Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems
and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685 (1983). Indeed, so many new centers have been created in the
last few years that at least one commentator has argued that "the needs of international
intercourse cannot effectively be served by the rapidly increasing number of international
arbitration institutions with different rules and processes." See Smit, The Future of Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 CoLUM. J. TRANSHA-'L
L. 9, 29 (1986). Professor Smit therefore proposes that a single international arbitration center
be created to replace the bewildering array of local and regional arbitration centers.
54. In the wake of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Chemtex Fibers, 617 F. Supp.
55 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), a case in which the trial court applied the reasoning of Mitsubishi to a
RICO claim, one commentator predicted that:
American courts in the last few years have witnessed a virtual flood of RICO claims
by private litigants against all kinds of buinesses. International arbitral tribunals
confronting disputes, which arise in or involve substantial communications to the
United States, should now fully expect a rising tide of RICO claims in the wake of
Mitsubishi. Resolution of issues arising under that statute are likely to be among
the most difficult an arbitration tribunal will face, for American courts are frequently
in conflict about the meaning, scope and application of this statute. Yet, there
should be no doubt that such claims will be asserted in arbitrations because of the
attractiveness of the remedies and the potential for obfuscation given the unsettled
nature of the law, which is increasingly being applied to "garden variety" unfair
and deceptive business practices and torts.
O'Neill, Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration:. An American Per-
spective, 4 J. INT'L ARa. 7, 12-13 (Mar. 1987).
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the arbitrators to the presentation of the claimant's case to the
defenses raised by the respondent. 5 Second, and more importantly,
they will cause questions to arise following the issuance of the award.
If the claimant is successful, and the respondent chooses to contest
the award, courts around the woild may be called on to review the
award. The results of such review could differ widely.
A. Pre-Award Questions Raised by Shearson
Assuming that the facts of a case make out a prima facie claim
of civil RICO,5 6 the first question to be resolved in any international
arbitration concerns the substantive law to be applied by the arbitra-
tors. Since RICO is a uniquely American law, a contract which states
that it is to be governed by any law other than that of the United
States will foreclose immediately the possibility of raising a civil
RICO claim.
A similar problem arises in those cases where the contract directs
the arbitrators to apply general principles of justice and equity. 57
Since civil RICO is not based on general principles, but instead was
enacted to combat the specific problem of organized crime, it would
be improper for an arbitral tribunal operating under a general prin-
ciples clause to agree to apply civil RICO.
In contracts that are silent as to which law is to govern, the
advocate must predict which law will be applied by the arbitrators.
Since, by its very nature, international arbitration offeis arbitrators
a wealth of choices when it comes to selecting the governing law,58
55. Throughout the rest of this article, the terms claimant and respondent will be used
and it will be assumed that the claimant is the party raising the civil RICO claim in the
arbitration. Of course, this assumption is made only for the purpose of readability, as a civil
RICO claim could be asserted in a counterclaim as easily as in the complaint.
56. While a discussion of the elements needed to make out a prima facie civil RICO
claim is beyond the scope of this article, the essential elements of a civil RICO action are: (a)
a pattern of racketeering activity; (b) the existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce; (c) a nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity and
the enterprise; and (d) a resulting injury to the plaintiff's business or property. For a more
complete discussion, see Duval, A Trial Lawyer's Guide: Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About RICO Before Your Case Was Dismissed, 12 VM. Mrrcmu. L. Rnv. 291 (1986).
57. Such clauses direct the panel to either act as amiables compositeurs (arbitrators
authorized to "abate the strictness of the law in favor of natural equity") or to act ex aequo
et bono ("according to equity and conscience"). See de Vries, International Commercial
Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57 TuL. L. REv. 42, 72-74 (1982).
See also Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 846, 860 (1961).
58. where the parties have not siecified which law is to apply, international arbitrators
generally are free to select whichever law they wish. See Poznanski, The Nature and Extent
of an Arbitrator's Powers in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 J. INT'L An-. 71, 74-78
(Sept. 1987).
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American law is very likely to be only one of several which will be
competing for the arbitrators' favor. The complexity of civil RICO
is likely to drive the arbitrators away from American law and towards
the selection of a different law, particularly if the arbitrators are not
American or if the contract specifies an arbitration forum outside
the United States, such as the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris.59
Where American law is specified in the contract, agreed to by the
parties, or chosen by the arbitrators, the next hurdle to be met is
the arbitration clause itself. In Shearson, the parties were operating
under broadly worded arbitration clauses that encompassed all dis-
putes arising out of the McMahon's account. As such, the Court did
not have to deal with whether claims based on civil RICO were
within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. But in deciding if a
civil RICO claim is possible, the international practitioner will have
to examine carefully the arbitration clause to determine whether there
is any language in the clause which prevents the raising of a civil
RICO claim.
In many transnational contracts, there will be language precluding
a civil RICO claim. Such language may be very specific or very
general. Examples include arbitration clauses which state that only
breaches recognized under the laws of both contracting parties may
be heard by the arbitrators and those that prohibit the arbitration
of any claim arising under statutory law.
At its heart, a civil RICO claim is an action for fraud.60 Under
American law, fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material
fact. 61 Consider, then, a contract between an American engineering
firm and a foreign government; the arbitration clause specifies that
only engineering, mechanical, or technical disputes may be submitted
to arbitration. On one hand, a civil RICO claim may be impermissible
because it alleges fraud, a claim which fits into none of the enu-
59. The International Chamber of Commerce [hereinafter ICC] remains the largest and
most important of the world's international arbitration centers, and as such many international
contracts call for arbitration before it. Because the ICC is primarily European in outlook and
personnel, its arbitrators' familiarity with civil RICO is likely to be limited at best. For an
overview of the ICC, see Gaudet, The International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitra-
tion, 4 INr'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 213 (1986).
60. See Hardy, Civil RICO: The Plaintiff's Lavyer as G-man, 13 LmATIoN 37, 37
(Summer 1987) ("The civil RICO statute ... has essentially created a new federal tort that
allows recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees for what some courts have called garden-
variety business fraud.")
61. See PRossER AND KaroN oN THE LAw OF TORTs § 105, at 728 (V. Keeton 4th ed.
1984).
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merated categories. On the other hand, a civil RICO claim might be
permissible if the alleged fraud deals with a technical aspect of the
project. Of course, resorting to the intentions of the parties when
ihey drafted the arbitration clause rarely will be useful, because
neither party at that time contemplated bringing a civil RICO claim.
Indeed, the foreign government probably would argue that it had
not even heard of civil RICO when it signed the contract.
Even in situations where a broadly-worded arbitration clause is
present, the respondent could argue that the claimant should not be
allowed to raise a civil RICO claim because of three separate public
policy considerations. First, the respondent could argue that civil
RICO is part of a criminal statute. While the Supreme Court in
Sedima recognized that civil RICO, despite being part of a compre-
hensive criminal statute, is an independent civil cause of action, an
international arbitration panel might not view civil RICO in the same
light. Indeed, a non-American arbitral tribunal easily could find that
the cause of action derives from what is clearly penal legislation, and
hold that the panel has no power to recognize or give effect to civil
RICO. 62
A second public policy ground which could be urged by the
respondent is that of unfair surprise or advantage. Although RICO
was enacted in 1970, the respondent could point to the fact thaf it
was not until 1985 that the United States Supreme Court held that
civil RICO was available in commercial disputes. The respondent
could further point out that it was not until June 1987 that the
Court held that such claims could be raised in arbitration. Thus, for
contracts signed prior to June 1987, the-respondent would be in a
strong position to argue that at the time the contract was signed the
possibility of a civil RICO claim being raised in an arbitration did
not exist. Such an argument could prove very persuasive to inter-
national commercial arbitrators. 63
62. Arbitrators, of course, have no power to enforce penal laws, and their awards may
be denied confirmation if they violate the penal laws of the forum state. See DomKe oN
COMNMErAL ARDn-RATiON §§ 33:04 and 34:02 (G. Wilner ed. 1984). In the United States, the
ban on enforcing penal legislation can be traced to The Antelope, 23 'U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,
123 (1825), in which Chief Justice Marshall held that "The Courts of no country execute the
penal laws of another .... "
63. It should be pointed out, however, that this argument was raised by the plaintiff in
Valero and soundly rejected. The Fifth Circuit wrote that:
Valero asserts that the arbitration clause is unenforceable because, at the time the
charter party agreement was entered into in May 1985 there was no indication that
RICO claims would be arbitrable .... We disagree .... It is well settled that an
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A final public policy ground which could be raised by the respon-
dent would be that the use of civil RICO in an international com-
mercial arbitration, even if legally permissible, violates common
notions about the arbitral process. Since many arbitrators view the
arbitral process as being designed to resolve disputes so that busi-
nesspersons can continue working together,r4 civil RICO might be
viewed as contrary to the spirit of arbitration. Because civil RICO
smacks of criminality, and a finding that the statute has been violated
brands the respondent as a racketeer in the business community, civil
RICO cannot help but be destructive to future business dealings.
These arguments may go far in convincing the arbitrators that civil
RICO is a roadblock to a successful resolution of the controversy.
If all of these obstacles are overcome, the advocate then must
attempt to prove'that the respondent is guilty of having engaged in
RICO-prohibited activity. In many respects, proving one's case in
arbitration will be the same as proving one's case in court. But in
some ways, there will be significant differences.
First, there is the fact that international commercial arbitration
operates without strict rules of evidence. As such, arbitrators will
permit much more evidence to be introduced than would a court.
This will prove to be very important for the party pursuing the civil
RICO claim. Many civil RICO claims heard in court tend to fail due
to the inability to have evidence admitted, especially with respect to
proving that the respondent was engaged in a racketeering enterprise.
Many times, whatever evidence exists is sketchy and is based on
appellate court should decide a case based on the law in effect at the time that the
case is before the court for review (citations omitted). Valero's argument would
"freeze" all legal interpretations at the moment that two parties entered into an
agreement. This approach has no basis in existing law, and we decline to adopt it.
813 F.2d at 64-65.
64. 473 U.S. at 633. Whether this view is shared by those who actually use arbitration
depends on the stage at which arbitration is sought. Where the parties are engaged in a long-
term contrapt and seek guidance with respect to an interim disagreement, the resolution of the
particular dispute is less important than the fulfillment of the contract's objectives. As such,
the real test of the arbitrators' skill is measured by how well the parties are able to work
together following the issuance of the award. Such arbitration is utilized most often in the
labor field, where the collective bargaining agreement anticipates and provides for piece-meal
arbitration of disputes as they arise. Where, however, the parties are at the end of the contract
(either because the contract has been completed or has been abandoned by one or both of the
parties), there usually is little interest in an award which seeks to "split the difference." In
such circumstances, the parties will generally be more interested in receiving vindication (in
the form of monetary restitution) from the arbitrators. This is particularly true in maritime
disputes, where arbitration typically is resorted to after the conclusion of the contract.
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inadmissible hearsay.65 While such evidence would not be admitted
by a court, it will be accepted by an arbitration panel.
An important problem with bringing a civil RICO claim in arbi-
tration, and one which may temper the ability to introduce otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence, is the fact that there is no discovery
in arbitration. The lack of discovery can be fatal to a civil RICO
claim, since much of the evidence needed to prove that the respondent
engaged in racketeering activities often will be obtainable only by
culling through the business records of the respondent. Although
international arbitrators do have limited powers to order discovery,6
they often will not exercise this power because of the widely held
view that discovery is a litigation tactic that has no. place in arbitra-
tion.
Even if the arbitrators do order discovery, it is likely that their
order simply will require the respondent to produce the requested
documents at the hearing. This will be of little help, as such pro-
duction will allow no time for the claimant to review the records
before putting on its case. Moreover, when the records are in the
possession of a non-party, it is an open question whether the arbi-
trators have any power to order production.6
A second difference between proving a RICO claim in court and
in arbitration is that, whereas the judge will be a trained lawyer, the
arbitrators may or may not be lawyers. Here again, the arbitration
clause will have to be reviewed, since it is not uncommon to find
that lawyers are prohibited from serving on the panel, 6 Even if
lawyers are on the panel, it is likely that they will have been trained
in a legal tradition other than the common law.69 Thus, the principle
65. Most RICO claims, whether criminal or civil in nature, depend on insider information
obtained from such persons as disgruntled former employees, ex-partners, and cheated spouses.
Moreover, many RICO claims are initiated on the basis of tips and hunches in the hope that
some evidence subsequently will be found to support the allegation. As a result, many RICO
suiis are dismissed qtickly. See DuVal, supra note 56, at 311-13.
66. For a useful summary of the international arbitrator's power to compel documentary
evidence from a party see Poznanski, supra note 58, at 101-03.
67. Id. at 103.
68. Many international arbitration clauses specify that the arbitrators are to be "com-
mercial men," and some clauses go so far as to state that the arbitrators shall not be lawyers.
Such clauses have been generally upheld. See, e.g., Pando Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Filmo
S.A.S., [1975] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 560; Rahcassi Shipping Co. S.A. v. Blue Star Line. Ltd., [1967]
2 Lloyd's L.R. 261.
69. It is easy for Iavyers trained in the Anglo-American legal system to forget that most
of the world's lawyers are trained in the civil law system.
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of stare decisis may have little meaning. 70 In such circumstances, the
words of the civil RICO statute will be of paramount importance,
and cases interpreting the statute will be given little, if any, weight.
Another difference will be apparent if the arbitration is being
conducted in a language other than English, as is so often true of
proceedings held outside the United States. If a foreign language is
employed, it will be necessary to translate RICO into the language
of the arbitration. This presents two problems. First, the RICO
statute is a badly drafted one. As difficult as it is to understand in
English, the RICO statute is even more difficult to understand when
translated into a foreign language. Second, any supporting material,
such as RICO's extensive legislative history, cases construing the
statute, and law review articles, also will have to be translated. While
such translations are likely to prove very expensive, they are critical
if the arbitrators are to understand fully the statute and catch its
subtle nuances.
A fourth difference concerns culture. While non-American arbitra-
tors may be willing to allow a civil RICO claim to be raised, the
cultural gap between the law and the arbitrators may prove vast.
Since no other country has a law that resembles RICO, foreign
arbitrators will not have any experience when it comes to applying
the law's provisions.
Even the most diligent foreign arbitrator may find it difficult to
shed his or her own legal tradition and follow civil RICO's command
to award treble damages. Since treble damages are still largely un-
known outside the United States, regardless of the degree of the
respondent's fault, it often will prove difficult to convince the arbi-
trators that the respondent should be required to pay three times the
damages incurred by the claimant. This is particularly true for
arbitrators whose legal systems do not permit arbitrators to award
punitive damages. Moreover, in countries where the concept of abuse
of right is particularly well developed, a claimant who insists too
strongly on his right to treble damages may find itself accused of
abuse of right.7'
70. Although it always is agreed in theory that arbitration is designed to be free from
such influences as stare decisis, in reality most international practitioners trained in the common
law place a great deal of stock in precedent, and are reluctant to abandon this practice simply
because the case is being tried in arbitration rather than in the courts. See Jarvis, The Problem
of Post-Hearing Delay in Maritime Arbitrations: "When Did You Say We Would Receive the
Arbitrators' Award?", 9 MD. I. INT'L L. & TRADE 19, 42 (1985). See also Iwaski, A Survey
of Maritime Arbitration in New York, 15 J. MAR. L. & Com. 69, 82-85 (1984).
71. The European concept of abus de droit, or abuse of right, is similar to the duty of
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A fifth difference between a civil RICO claim brought in court
and one heard in arbitration will involve the applicable standards to
be used. Despite the Supreme Court's favorable pronouncements in
Sedima and Shearson, lower federal courts continue to seek ways to
cut back on the scope of civil RICO. As a result, the law surrounding
civil RICO continues to vary widely from circuit to circuit.72 Thus,
while a claimant may have a very strong civil RICO claim under the
prevailing law of one circuit, such a claim may fail under the
guidelines established by another circuit. In asking an international
arbitration panel to adopt the test of one circuit over the test of
another, the panel may decline to choose either. Such a panel may
defer decision until the Supreme Court determines which interpreta-
tion is correct. Otherwise it might be imprudent for an arbitration
panel, especially a foreign one, to attempt to resolve this controversy.
B. Post-Award Questions Raised by Shearson
Assuming that one is able to convince the arbitrators to award
civil RICO damages, several problems can occur when the claimant
seeks to confirm its award.73 Potentially the most serious problem
concerns the failure of the arbitrators to state clearly that they have
found the respondent guilty of violating civil RICO. If, in a $10
million breach of contratt suit, the arbitrators award $30 million, a
reasonable conclusion is that the arbitrators have found for the
claimant and awarded treble damages. But if the award does not
state specifically that they have found the respondent guilty of
violating RICO, the award may be subject to challenge for being
excessive or for being so imperfectly executed as failing to constitute
a confirmable final award.74
good faith found in American contract law. Abuse of right has been described as follows:
"But wherever the law leaves a matter to the judgment of the person exercising the right, this
discretion must be exercised in good faith, and the law will intervene in all cases where this
discretion is abused." B. CrmNe, GaEtmAL Piu iPcLEs OF LAW 132-33 (2d ed. 1987). See also
K. BocKsTIEoG, AiwrnArioN AND STATE E.TERPRiss 45 (1984) (noting that states may not
abuse legal forms and rights).
72. See Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TL.
MAR. L. J. (1987) (forthcoming).
73. The difficulties in confirming the award will depend in large part on the law of the
forum. The discussion here assumes that the award is to be confirmed in the United States.
For an insightful article which compares various confirmation forums, see Vartian, Choice of
Confirmation Forum in International Commercial Arbitration Agreements, 21 'Mx. INr'L L.
J. 67 (1985).
74. This certainly would appear to be the case under 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
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While some courts may draw the reasonable conclusion that the
arbitrators meant to, and did, find the respondent guilty of violating
civil RICO, and therefore confirm the award, other courts may throw
it out for the reason that the award is unclear on its face. Of course,
some courts may direct that the award be sent back to the arbitrators
for clarification, although it is likely that at least some courts would
not permit clarification in these circumstances.7 5
A similar problem arises if, again in a $10 million breach of
contract suit, the arbitrators expressly state that they find the re-
spondent guilty of violating civil RICO and go on to award $15
million. If the arbitrators found that the claimant suffered $5 million
in actual damages and therefore awarded treble damages, for a total
award of $15 million, the award is fine. But if the arbitrators agreed
that the claimant had suffered $10 million in actual damages, but
then chose to award only $5 million in additional compensation
because the thought of awarding $10 million in additional damages
was unpalatable, the award may be defective. 76 In such a case, four
options are open to the court: 1) increasing the damages and con-
firming the award as a $30 million award; 2) sending the award back
to the arbitrators so that they can make the necessary adjustment;
3) confirming merely the actual damages of $10 million, and throwing
out the rest of the award; or 4) throwing the award out in its entirety.
A different kind of problem can arise if the award is to be
confirmed or enforced in a country other than the United States.
Consider a properly issued award that includes civil RICO damages
and that is brought to a foreign country for enforcement. In many
instances, it is likely that the foreign court will refuse to grant
recognition to the award, either in whole or in part, due to the fact
that it contains the additional RICO damages. Such refusal could
easily be based on the position that the award violates the public
policy of the forum." This is especially true in those countries that
75. Under 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982), a United States court could modify the award on its
own in some circumstances. In most instances, however, it would be required to vacate the
award. Another possibility is to send the award back to the arbitrators, although the doctrine
of functus officio would serve as a bar in many cases. The doctrine is discussed in Domke,
supra note 62, at § 22:01.
76. One court, however, has ruled that civil RICO's treble damages cannot be awarded
against a party who is immune from punitive damages awards. Summers v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 592 F. Supp. 1240, 1242-43 (W.D. Okla. 1984),
77. This defense, of course, is one of the few expressly permitted under the 1958 United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Bnforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The convention, which now is adhered to
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have enacted clawback laws designed to prevent parties from col-
lecting treble damages pursuant to American antitrust laws 78 A
decision to try to enforce an arbitral award containing civil RICO
damages also may open the claimant to charges of abuse of process.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY Shearson
There are ways to minimize the problems Shearson presents to an
impending arbitration. Some of the problems can be solved by lawyers
through careful planning. Such planning must begin, however, as
soon as the case is received by the claimant's lawyer.
The first question that must be answered is whether a civil RICO
claim is possible. This will require a close examination of the arbi-
tration clause and an evaluation of the likelihood that the arbitrators
will choose American law. Whether this is a possibility will be obvious
from the clause itself, which may or may not contain a choice of
law provision. If no law is specified, there is at least a chance that
American law will be applied. In such circumstances, the advocate
should argue that American law is to apply either because the parties
are American, or because the transaction took place in the United
States, or because the breach occurred in the United States. If the
facts support none of these allegations, but the arbitration clause
calls for the arbitration to be held in the United States, the advocate
should argue that the selection of an American forum shows that
the parties intended to have American law apply. Finally, the past
practices and customs of the parties may reveal a reliance on Amer-
ican law on previous occasions, thereby providing a basis for the
application of American law.
Second, the facts must support a civil RICO claim. Since many of
the facts will not be known immediately, the advocate should assume
that the facts are unfavorable. Next, the facts which are known
by more than seventy countries, including the United States, China, France, Italy, the S6viet
Union, the United Kingdom, and Wvest Germany, states in Article V(2)(b) that an award may
be refused confirmation if it is contrary to the public policy of the forum. This defense, which
has been litigated more often than any of the other defenses of the Convention, is examined
in detail in Note, The Express Defenses of the N.Y. Conivention on Foreign Arbitral Awards,
5 N.Y.L. Sc. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 103, 121-26 (1983).
78. An example of such legislation is the United Kingdom's Protection of Trading Interests
Act (1980). Under § 6 of the Act, a citizen of the United Kingdom or a person carrying on
business in the United Kingdom is able to recover, or "clawback," so much of any judgment
which "exceeds the part attributable to compensation." See Kalm, The Protection of Trading
Interests Act of 1980: Britain's Response to U.S. Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement, 2
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 476 (1980).
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should be weighed against the case law of the circuit with the least
hospitable record towards civil RICO claims. At the same time, the
case law of other circuits should be checked to determine which
circuit provides the most helpful precedents. During this time attempts
should be made to develop a connection between the case and the
most favorable circuit, so as to convince the arbitrators that they
need not concern themselves with the conflicting law of other circuits.
Once again, the situs of the transaction, the headquarters of the
parties, the location of subsidiaries, agents, or representatives, and
the place of the breach all may provide a basis for arguing that the
law of a particular circuit is to be applied.
Assuming that the law and the facts are favorable, thought must
next be given to whether a civil RICO claim should be raised at all.
This decision can only be made after consultation with the client.
Foreign clients will need to be brought into the office for an extensive
session in which civil RICO is explained in great detail. The purpose
of the review is twofold. First, it acquaints the client with the benefits
and disadvantages of civil RICO, including the possibility of winning
treble damages and attorneys' fees and the fact that there will be
significant obstacles to pursuing the claim. Second, the session, if
properly conducted, will give the client a sense of how the other side
is likely to respond when it is accused of being a racketeer. While
some opponents will settle quickly rather than face the possibility of
being labelled a mobster, most respondents will view the allegation
as a challenge to their business ethics and will dig in for a long
fight. This, of course, will make future settlement negotiations more
difficult, a fact which the client needs to know prior to commencing
the RICO claim.
In preparing for the strategy session with the client, it is advisable
to send background material on the statute to the client prior to the
meeting. In addition, an advance meeting with the client's legal
department is advisable. The decision to bring a civil RICO claim is
usually made by an in-house legal staff, if available, although the
choice initially should be broached with the client's top management
because of the potential pitfalls and costs. At the meeting with the
legal staff, it is useful to decide whether outside counsel will present
the entire program or whether the presentation will be a joint one.
At the strategy session with the client, a pre-set agenda should be
followed. This is vital if all the points concerning the statute are to
be covered. The lack of an agenda allows the meeting to go off on
one of the many side issues of the statute, thereby causing the client
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to lose sight of the big picture. Moreover, a detailed agenda .will
help the client stay in the flow of the conversation, and allow the
client to ask better questions both at the session and afterwards.
Assuming that the strategy session is held and the client authorizes
the bringing of a civil RICO claim, written confirmation to this
effect should be obtained. 79
One of the most important subjects to be discussed with the client
is the selection of an arbitrator, assuming that the arbitration envi-
sions each party selecting an arbitrator, as usually is the case in
international arbitration. However, the selection of the arbitrator will
be a more pressing concern if the arbitration is being held on an ad
hoc basis, as opposed to an administered arbitration, since ad hoc
arbitrations typically permit greater freedom in the choosing of an
arbitrator. Regardless of the type of arbritation to be held, however,
the identity of the arbitrator is critical. In picking an arbitrator to
hear a civil RICO claim, one will have to keep in mind that other
claims will also be presented, and that the civil RICO claim may
disappear between the time the arbitrator is appointed and the case
is presented. Nevertheless, because of RICO's unique status, the
chosen arbitrator should be fully competent to hear and decide a
civil RICO claim. In addition, if the other members of the arbitration
panel are not Americans, the claimant's arbitrator must be able to
explain the statute to his fellow arbitrators and must be able to
articulate clearly the claimant's civil RICO claim. 0
Until arbitrators gain experience with civil RICO and establish a
track record on such claims,"' it probably will be necessary to select
American attorneys or law professors who have familiarity with civil
RICO. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the person
selected does not have pre-conceived views on civil RICO which will
be inimical to the client's case. A review of the candidate's writings,
speeches, pleadings, and testimony on civil RICO therefore will be
necessary.
79. Since it is not uncommon for foreign tribunals to demand proof that an attorney is
authorized to represent its client and bring the subject claim, written authorization will avoid
having to return to the client at a later stage. Of course, counsel must be careful to ensure
that revealing the authorization will not waive any applicable attorney-client or attorney work
product privilege.
80. It must be kept in mind, however, that outside the United States party-appointed
arbitrators are expected to be independent of the party which selected them. Failure to observe
this principle may be grounds for setting the award aside in many countries. See de Vries,
supra note 57, at 69-70.
81. The use of track records to select commercial arbitrators is discussed in Jarvis, supra
note 70. 1
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The selection of a lawyer or law professor will not be possible if
the arbitration clause forbids the selection of attorneys as arbitrators.
In such cases, an arbitrator whose past record demonstrates flexibility
and an ability to grasp legal concepts is the ideal candidate. Any
evidence that the candidate is willing to use arbitration as a means
of punishing dishonest businessmen, rather than simply as a mech-
anism to resolve disputes, makes the candidate more likely to award
civil RICO damages.
82
Once the arbitrator is selected, thought must be given next to the
arbitration proceeding itself. If the arbitration is to be held in a
language other than English, translations will be needed of the statute
and any supporting material which will be provided. Since obtaining
good translations is both expensive and time consuming, the material
to be provided should be selected early and should be edited with
care. Even if the arbitration is to be conducted in English, translating
the statute and other materials into the native languages of any non-
English speaking arbitrators will be appreciated by the panel and is
likely to make the panel more receptive to the claim. It also is
important that the court reporter be prepared, so that he or she will
be familiar with the jargon of civil RICO. Failure to do so will slow
down the hearings and may result in an inaccurate transcript.
Prior to the first hearing, it will be useful to sit down with the
chairman of the arbitration panel, if one has been appointed, or with
the entire panel, if such an opportunity exists, to discuss the civil
RICO claim. While there are instances when the need for surprise
will dictate otherwise, in most cases a pre-hearing conference to
discuss civil RICO will pay large dividends. Such a meeting will allow
the arbitrators to become comfortable with the civil RICO aspects
of the claim and will allow the advocate to judge the panel's reaction
to such a claim. It will also take away any argument of unfair
surprise by the respondent, who will have received adequate notice
that a civil RICO claim will be presented. Such notice may be
especially important if there are arbitrators on the panel who dislike
arbitration by surprise. Of course, where the claimant has made it
82. Until recently, maritime arbitrators in New York, drawn largely from the ranks of
shipping industry executives, steadfastly refused to award punitive damages even where the
claimant had proved that the respondent had engaged in outright theft. This practice finally
was broken in September 1987, when a maritime arbitrator, chiding his fellow arbitrators for
their reluctance, awarded $100,000 in punitive damages to a charterer that proved that its
cargo had been stolen systematically by the shipowner. See Octonia Trading Ltd. v. Stinnes
Interoil GmbH (Berg, sole arbitrator; Sept. 17, 1987). The decision is discussed in Maritime
Dispute Resolved with First Award of Panitive Damages, 2 INnL' ARB. REP. 692 (OcT. 1987).
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clear, either in its demand for arbitration or in the joint stipulation
(if there is one), that it intends to raise a civil RICO claim, the
concern that the respondent will raise the banner of unfair surprise
may be adequately addressed even if a pre-hearing conference is not
held.
With the stage now set, it is useful to provide the arbitrators with
a pre-hearing memorandum on civil RICO which reviews the various
elements of such a claim. Where the arbitrators have requested pre-
hearing briefs, such an examination can be incorporated easily into
the brief. Where no pre-hearing briefs have been requested, permis-
sion should be sought. If the procedural rules bar the submission of
pre-hearing briefs, the claimant's attorney should ask to be allowed
to provide the arbitrators with a short overview of civil RICO,
together with a copy of the RICO statute. It should be explained to
the arbitrators that the overview is not meant to be argumentative,
but merely is designed to acquaint the panel with the nature of civil
RICO claims. An excerpt from a good law review article may be
adequate.
The next area of concern for the advocate should be the preparation
of witnesses. Just as the arbitrators must understand civil RICO
from the outset of the case, so must the claimant's witnesses.
Although fact witnesses normally do not need to understand the
basis of the claimant's legal strategy, civil RICO is different. Its
emphasis on enterprise activity, coupled with its specific pattern
requirements, makes it crucial for all witnesses to understand the
desired end result. Since arbitration permits hearsay evidence to be
introduced freely, fact witnesses must be made to understand civil
RICO so that they can clearly articulate all of their knowledge about,
and transactions with, the respondent, especially where the witness
has had a long course of dealing with the respondent. If this is done,
the various prerequisites to a successful civil RICO claim stand a
very good chance of being met.
Thought also must be given to whether expert witnesses will be
called. For the most part, expert witnesses are not used in arbitration
because the arbitrators are experts themselves. But again, civil RICO
claims are different. The testimony of an accountant to trace the
flow of money, for example, can be very helpful in establishing the
existence of a pattern. Similarly, analysts who can explain -how the
respondent came to dominate a particular market through the estab-
lishment of a RICO enterprise can be very persuasive. Demonstrative
evidence, such as charts and graphs, can help the expert to com-
municate his point to the arbitrators.
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Finally, some thought should be given to calling an expert to testify
about RICO. Because of the complexity of the statute, expert testi-
mony prior to the presentation of fact witnesses can help the arbi-
trators identify the type of information they should be seeking. If a
civil RICO expert is called, he or she should be asked about the
different standards used by the circuits, and should be given the
opportunity to explain why a particular standard or test is more
appropriate than another.
Once all of this preparation is completed, the next task comes
when the hearings have been closed and the arbitrators have indicated
that they are ready to retire to consider their decision. At this point
it is critical to speak to the arbitrators about the form the award
will take. This can be somewhat awkward for the claimant, who
must speak to the arbitrators about what is inherently a very sensitive
subject. Nevertheless, failure to discuss the award with the panel at
this juncture can result in disaster in the future.
If the arbitrators are under rules which require or assume that the
award will be given without reasons, 3 the advocate simply should
confirm that the arbitrators intend to follow this practice. But where
the award typically is given as a reasoned one, the advocate must
discuss two issues with the panel. First, the advocate must stress to
tile panel the importance of making a specific finding as to whether
the respondent has violated civil RICO. Second, the panel must be
instructed that if the respondent did violate civil RICO, the award
must treble the damages, and that is not within the power of the
arbitrators to award some lesser amount, such as double damages.
83. Many arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitration Association and the
London Salvage Association; direct their arbitrators simply to state which party has prevailed.
In this way, their awards are immune from charges that the arbitrators misapplied the law.
This fact was noted in I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 429
(2d Cir. 1974), where the court wrote:
It seems rather anomalous, but had the arbitral majority failed to render a written
opinion in this case, our ability... to review that decision would be greatly limited.
Indeed, the AAA apparently discourages the practice of written arbitral opinions in
order to insulate the arbitral process from any judicial review.
Id. Although there is no legal requirement that arbitrators state the reasons for their awards,
see Domke, supra note 62, at § 29:06, most international arbitra awards do provide such
reasons. This practice has been applauded by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Carbon-
neau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of
International Transactions, 23 CoLTJm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579 (1985). The use of reasoned
awards in international arbitration has become so pervasive that the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, established to hear claims arising out of the fail of the Shah and the subsequent
takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, modified its rules expressly to permit dissenting
opinions. See Bockstiegel, Applying the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 266, 271 (1986).
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With the panel so instructed, there is little to do but wait for the
award. Once the award is received, it should be scrutinized carefully
to see if the panel has made any mistake, such as a mathematical
one, with respect to the awarding of civil RICO damages. If so, the
award should be sent back immediately to the panel with a request
that the mistake be corrected. While the panel may or may not make
the correction, the advocate has begun to lay a paper trail. Since in
most instances it will be necessary to go to court if there is a problem
with the award, such a trail may prove quite important.
Lastly, there is the problem of attempting to enforce a civil RICO
arbitration award in a forum other than the United States. Regardless
of the foreign country in which execution is to take place, it is likely
that the civil RICO damages will raise questions. To answer them,
the advocate should take three steps as soon as possible. First, it
should provide the foreign court with the same background infor-
mation about the statute as was provided to the arbitrators. Second,
a list of all the steps taken by the claimant to make the respondent
aware of the civil RICO claim, and to give it a full and fair
opportunity to respond, should be submitted. Third, an expert witness
on RICO should be available so that the foreign court can pose
whatever questions it may have about the statute. If, for example, a
law professor was used during the arbitration as an expert witness
on civil RICO, he or she may be used again in the foreign court
proceedings. While there is no guarantee that these steps will carry
the day, they should go far in convincing the foreign court that
arbitration awards based on civil RICO are entitled to recognition
outside the United States.$
V. AvoIDING Tm TkAPs OF Shearson
As is obvious from the foregoing, the Shearson decision provides
international practitioners with an important new remedy when their
clients submit to international arbitration. By the same token, the
case also raises a host of potential problems which only partially can
be addressed by the advocate at the arbitration stage. The only truly
effective way to ensure that one's client will get the full benefit of
84. For a further discussion, see Sidel, The Acceptance of Emerging American Law
Abroad: Could "Maritime RICO" Work in the People's Republic of China?, 12 Tux. MaR.
L.J. (1987) (forthcoming) (speculating that Chinese courts will not enforce an arbitration award
based on civil RICO, especially where the award has been rendered against a Chinese state-
owned corporation).
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civil RICO is to tailor the arbitration agreement to take civil RICO
into account.
This can be done in a variety of ways. One way would be to have
the arbitration agreement read in pertinent part as follows:
All claims arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In any arbitration held pursuant to this clause, either
party is expressly granted the right to raise a claim that the other
party has violated sections 1961-1968 of Title 18 of the United
States Code, as amended.
Another means of wording the agreement would be as follows:
All disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In any arbitration held pursuant to this clause, either
party may recover for any violation by the other party of the so-
called civil RICO provisions of the federal laws of the United States.
Still another alternative would be:
All disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In any arbitration held pursuant to this clause, either
party may recover for any violation of any statute of the United
States.
Of course, endless modifications of these three examples are possible.
By the same token, an advocate may wish to have civil RICO claims
heard only in court, and may therefore wish the arbitration agreement
to state that:
All disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In any arbitration held pursuant to this clause, neither
party shall be permitted to raise a claim based on sections 1961-
1968 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as amended.
If civil RICO claims are to be submitted to arbitration, the drafter
should consider requiring the panel to include lawyers. All of the
arbitrators can be required to be lawyers, or just the chairman can
be required to be a lawyer. Alternatively, the panel members can be
non-lawyers but the clause can stipulate that the panel shall appoint
and confer with an expert witness who shall be a lawyer or law
professor with expertise in civil RICO. Such a clause could say:
All disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In the event that either party shall raise a claim based
on sections 1961-1968 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as
amended, the arbitrators shall select an independent expert who
shall be able to provide guidance with respect to such claims.
One of the most important points to cover in drafting an arbitration
clause for use in an international transaction concerns which circuit's
law is to be used by the arbitrators in resolving civil RICO claims.
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Such a clause is necessary to avoid the problem that different circuits
are using varying standards in dealing with civil RICO. A clause
could therefore say:
All disputes arising out of the contract shall be resolved through
arbitration. In the event that either party shall raise a claim based
on sections 1961-1968 of Title 18 of the United States Code, as
amended, the arbitrators shall apply the law of the United States
Court of Appeals for the - Circuit to decide the claim.
There is no need to make reference to the Supreme Court, since
circuits are bound by the Supreme Court. If one is concerned,
however, one can always have the clause refer to both the Supreme
Court and the particular circuit court. One problem in referring to
a specific circuit is that the law of the chosen circuit may prove to
be unfavorable at the time of the arbitration. Thus, counsel may
wish to have the clause say that the law to be applied is that law in
effect on a certain date. Doing so allows highly favorable case law
to be locked in.
It is probable that in many instances the client will veto any
suggestion to raise the subject of civil RICO while the contract is
being negotiated. Accordingly, the attorney should attempt to have
the arbitration clause drafted in a manner that will permit a civil
RICO claim to be raised if a dispute should later develop. Thus,
even without any reference in the arbitration clause to civil RICO,
the advocate will have helped his or her client immeasurably if the
arbitration clause contains any of the following provisions:
a) specifies that the arbitrators shall be United States citizens;
b) states that the arbitration will be conducted in English;
c) provides that the cost of translations and expert witnesses will
be borne by the losing party or shared-equally by both parties;
d) directs the panel to issue its award without reasons;
e) provides for the arbitration to be held in the United States;
f) permits any statutory claim to be raised; or
g) selects the law of the United States as the applicable law.
Regardless of how the arbitration clause is drafted, care must be
taken to ensure that the clause does not become so cumbersome that
it ends up causing, rather than avoiding, litigation. In addition, the
clause must be neutral and provide both sides with equal rights with
respect to civil RICO. If this principle is not observed, the entire
award could be jeopardized.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to permit civil RICO claims to be
raised in international arbitration has worked a profound change and
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provided claimants with a new and important weapon. The full
benefit of this change can not be realized, however, unless all of the
pitfalls of Shearson are understood and prepared for. While this
requires a great deal of effort, there can be little doubt that the end
result will make such effort worthwhile.
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APPENDIX
§ 1961. Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving
murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,
dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable
under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code:
Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports
bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting),
section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to
the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465
(relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law
enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness,
victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against
a witness, victim, or an informafit), section 1951 (relating to inter-
ference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating
to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of
wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of
monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity),
sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen
motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate trans-
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portation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in
certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346
(relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24
(relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under
title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on
payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating
to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities,
or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment,
buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (B) any
act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act.
(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or
possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding
a legal or beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi-
viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date
of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity;
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in
gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United
States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforce-
able under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal
or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was
incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of
the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof,
or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate
usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at
least twice the enforceable rate;
(7) "racketeering investigator" means any attorney or investigator
so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of
enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter;
(8) "racketeering investigation" means any inquiry conducted by
any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether
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any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of
any final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United
States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this
chapter;
(9) "documentary material" includes any book, paper, document,
record, recording, or other material; and
(10) "Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of the
United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States,
any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee
of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or
agency of the United States so designated by the Attorney General
to carry but the powers conferred on the Attorfiey General by this
chapter. Any department or agency so designated may use in inves-
tigations authorized by this chapter either the in4.estigative provisions
of this chapter or the ifiviestigative power of such department or
agency otherwise conferred by law.
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
income derived,- directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt- in- which such
person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code; to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acqui-
sition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open
market for purposes of- investment, and without the intention, of
controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
another- to do so, shall not be unlawfulunder-this subsection if the
securities of the-issuer held by the.purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any. pattern or
racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do. not amount in the aggregate- to one percent- of the
outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in
law or in fact, the.power to elect one or more directors of the-issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
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(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any
of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
§ 1963. Criminal penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irre-
spective of any provision of State law-
(1) Any interest the person has acquired or maintained in vio-




(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a
source of influence over;
Any enterprise which the person has established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of
section 1962; and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
which the person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering
activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of section 1962.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that
the person forfeit to the United States all property described in this
subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a
defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense
may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section in-
cludes-
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and
found in land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights,
privileges, interests, claims, and securities.
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection
(a) vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving
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rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is
subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall
be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee
establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (I) that he is a bona
fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject
to forfeiture under this section.
(d)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may enter
a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfac-
tory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the
availability of property described in subsection (a) for forfeiture
under this section-
(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the
property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the
event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section; or
(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information,
if, after notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property
and opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that-
(i) there is a substantial probability that the United States
will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the
order will result in the property being destroyed, removed from the
jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture;
and
(ii) the need to preserve the availability of the property
through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on
any party against whom the order is to be entered:
Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subpara-
graph (B) shall be effective for not more than ninety days, unless
extended by the court for good cause shown or unless an indictment
or information described in subparagraph (A) has been filed.
(2) A temporary restraining order under this subsection may be
entered upon .application of the United States without notice or
Opportunity for a hearing when an information or indictment has
not yet been filed with respect to the property, if the United States
demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of
conviction,. be subject to forfeiture under this section and that
provision of notice will jeopardize the availability of the property
for forfeiture. Such a temporary order shall expire not more than
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ten days after the date on which it is entered, unless extended for
good cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered
consents to an extension for a longer period. A hearing requested
concerning an order entered under this paragraph shall be held at
the earliest possible time, and prior to the expiration of the temporary
order.
(3) The court may receive and consider at a hearing held pursuant
to this subsection, evidence and information that would be inadmis-
sible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(e) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall
enter a judgment of forfeiture of the property to the United States
and shall also authorize the Attorney General to seize all property
ordered forfeited upon such terms and conditions as the court shall
deem proper. Following the entry of an order declaring the property
forfeited, the court may, upon application of the United States, enter
such appropriate restraining orders or injunctions, require the exe-
cution of satisfactory performance bonds, appoint receivers, conser-
vators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action
to protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered
forfeited. Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or
an interest in an enterprise required by law, or which has been
ordered forfeited under this section may be used to offset ordinary
and necessary expenses to the enterprise which are necessary to protect
the interests of the United State or third parties.
(f) Following the seizure of property ordered forfeited under this
section, the Attorney General shall direct the disposition of the
property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making
due provision for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property
right or interest not exercisable by, or transferable for value to, the
United State shall expire and shall not revert to the defendant, nor
shall the defendant or any person acting in concert with or on behalf
of the defendant be eligible to purchase forfeited property at any
sale held by the United States. Upon application of a person, other
than the defendant or a person acting in concert with or on behalf
of the defendant, the court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition
of the property pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal
case giving rise to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that
proceeding with the sale or disposition of the property will result in
irreparable injury, harm or loss to him. Notwithstanding 31 U.S.C.
3302(b), the proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property
forfeited under this section and any moneys forfeited shall be used
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to pay all proper expenses for the forfeiture and the sale, including
exppnses of seizure, maintenance and custody of the property pending
its disposition, advertising and court costs. The Attorney General
shall deposit in the Treasury any amounts of such proceeds or moneys
remaining after the payment of such expenses.
(g) With respect to property ordered forfeited under this section,
the Attorney General is authorized to-
(1) grant petitions for mitigation .or remission of forfeiture,
restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter,
or take any other action. to protect the rights of innocent persons
which is in the interest of justice and which is not inconsistent with
the provisions of this chapter;
(2) compromise claims arising, under this section;
(3) award compensation to persons providing information re-
sulting in a forfeiture under this section;
(4) direct the disposition by the United States of all property
ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other
commercially feasible means, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons; and
(5) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and main-
tain property ordered forfeited under this section pending its dispo-
sition.
(h) The Attorney General may promulgate regulations with respect
to-
(1) making reasonable efforts to provide notice to persons who
may have an interest in property ordered forfeited under this section;
(2) granting petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture;
(3) the restitution of property to victims of an offense.petitioning
for remission or "mitigation of forfeiture under this chapter;
(4) the disposition by the United States of forfeited property by
public sale or other commercially feasible means;
(5) the maintenance and safekeeping of any property forfeited
under this section pending its disposition; and "
(6) the compromise of claims arising under this chapter.
Pending the promulgation of such regulations, all provisions of law
relating to the disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale
thereof, or the remission or mitigation. of forfeitures for violation of
the customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of
compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures shall apply
to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the
provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent
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with the provisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the
Customs Service or any person with respect to the disposition of
property under the customs law shall be performed under this chapter
by the Attorney General.
(i) Except as provided in subsection (I), no party claiming an
interest in property subject to forfeiture under this section may-
(1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the
forfeiture of such property under this section; or
(2) commence an action at law or equity against the United
States concerning the validity of his alleged interest in the property
subsequent to the filing of an indictment or information alleging that
the property is subject to forfeiture under this section.
(j) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to enter orders as provided in this section without regard to the
location of any property which may be subject to forfeiture under
this section or which has been ordered forfeited under this section.
(k) In order to facilitate the identification or location of property
declared forfeited and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for
remission or mitigation of forfeiture, after the entry of an order
declaring property forfeited to the United States the court may, upon
application of the United States, order that the testimony of any
witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition and
that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or
other material not privileged be produced at the same time and place,
in the same manner as provided for the taking of depositions under
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(1)(1) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this
section, the United States shall publish notice of the order and of
its intent to dispose of the property in such manner as the Attorney
General may direct. The Government may also, to the extent prac-
ticable, provide direct written notice to any person known to have
alleged an interest in the property that is the subject of the order of
forfeiture as a substitute for published notice as to those persons so
notified.
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal
interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United
States pursuant to this section may, within thirty days of the final
publication of notice or his receipt of notice under paragraph (1),
whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate
the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing shall
be held before the court alone, without a jury.
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(3) The petition shall be signed by the petitioner under penalty
of perjury and shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's
right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances
of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the
property, any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and
the relief sought.
(4) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable
and consistent with the interests of justice, be held within thirty days
of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate-the hearing
on the petition with a hearing on any other petition filed by a person
other than the defendant under this subsection.
(5) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence
and witnesses on his own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing. The United States may present evidence and
witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of its claim to the property and
cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition to
testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall
consider the relevant portions of the record of the criminal case
which resulted in the order of forfeiture.
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitibner
has established by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the
property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of
forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or
interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was
superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time
of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of
the property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the
right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture under this section; the court shall amend the order of
forfeiture in accordance with its determination.
(7) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under
this subsection, or if no such petitions are filed following the expi-
ration of the period provided in paragraph (2) for the filing of such
petitions, the United States shall have clear title to property that is
the subject of the order of forfeiture and may warrant good title to
any subsequent purchaser or 'transferee.
(in) If any of the property described in subsection (a), as a result
of any act of omission of the defendant-
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(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
party;
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or
(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be
divided without difficulty;
the court shall order the forfeiture of any property of the defendant
up to the value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through
(5).
§ 1964. Civil remedies
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by
issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering
any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activ-
ities or investment of any person, including, but not limited to,
prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate
or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of
any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent
persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this
section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any
time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other
actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds,
as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United
States in any criminal proceeding'brought by the United States under
this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the United States.
